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In determining the prime cause of a physical event, people often weight one of two entities
in a symmetric physical relation as more important for bringing about the causal effect than
the other. In a broad survey (Bender and Beller, 2011), we documented such weighting
effects for different kinds of physical events and found that their direction and strength
depended on a variety of factors. Here, we focus on one of those: adding a contrast situation
that—while being formally irrelevant—foregrounds one of the factors and thus frames the
task in a speciﬁc way. In two experiments, we generalize and validate our previous ﬁndings
by using different stimulus material (in Experiment 1), by applying a different response
format to elicit causal assignments, an analog rating scale instead of a forced-choice
decision (in Experiment 2), and by eliciting explanations for the physical events in question
(in both Experiments).The results generally conﬁrm the contrast effects for both response
formats; however, the effects were more pronounced with the force-choice format than
with the rating format. People tended to refer to the given contrast in their explanations,
which validates our manipulation. Finally, people’s causal assignments are reﬂected in
the type of explanation given in that contrast and property explanations were associated
with biased causal assignments, whereas relational explanations were associated with
unbiased assignments. In the discussion, we pick up the normative questions of whether
or not these contrast effects constitute a bias in causal reasoning.
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INTRODUCTION
“Is the fact that a piece of wood ﬂoats on water basically due to
(a) the piece of wood or (b) the water?”
Confronted with this question, about 70% of the German par-
ticipants in two studies respond “it is due to the wood” (Beller
et al., 2009; Bender and Beller, 2011). When asked to explain
their choice, the majority of these participants mentioned phys-
ical concepts like weight or density, which they know from their
physics education, but they ascribed them exclusively to one of
the two entities (Beller et al., 2009). Only a few participants noted
that, of course, the two entities are equally involved in bring-
ing about the effect of ﬂoating. It’s the relation of the densities
of both, wood and water, that counts. In assigning a stronger
causal weight to the piece of wood, people thus ignore the rela-
tional nature of the event and the inherent symmetry that the
wood contributes to the ﬂoating to exactly the same extent as the
water.
This kind of weighting in symmetric physical settings is not
unusual; we ﬁnd it for different physical events and in different cul-
tures (e.g., ; Peng andKnowles, 2003; Beller et al., 2009; Bender and
Beller, 2011)1. Across these studies, the direction and the strength
of the effect vary considerably, but identifying the sources for this
variability is just in its beginning. So far, the following factors were
1A broader discussion of causal reasoning across domains and cultures is provided
in the Research Topic Diversity and universality in causal cognition published in
Frontiers in Cognitive Science (Beller et al., 2014).
suggested: the presentation format of the task, that is whether an
event is presented visually (Peng and Knowles, 2003; White, 2007)
or verbally (Bender and Beller, 2011); the response format, that
is whether participants are asked for responsibility assignments
(Morris and Peng, 1994; Bender and Beller, 2011) or for explana-
tions (Peng and Knowles, 2003); particular linguistic features such
as agent and patient roles (Beller et al., 2009; Mayrhofer andWald-
mann, 2014); and framing processes that deﬁne what to consider
as the ﬁgure and what as the background of a scene (Bender and
Beller, 2011).
This plurality of factors resonates quite well with what we know
from research on causal judgments in general, namely that such
judgments can be inﬂuenced in various ways: by the familiarity,
imageability, and believability of cause and effect relationships
(Fugelsang and Thompson, 2000, 2001; Fugelsang et al., 2006),
by linguistic cues and the speciﬁc causal content (Kuhnmünch
and Beller, 2005), by the broader communicative context (Hilton,
1990), by goal-relevant information (Hilton and Knibbs, 1988),
by knowledge about possible causal mechanisms (Koslowski et al.,
1989; Ahn et al., 1995; Fugelsang and Thompson, 2003; Catena
et al., 2008), or by the perceived spatial and temporal aspects of
the physical situation (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; and see also
Buehner and Humphreys, 2010).
In this paper we focus speciﬁcally on one modulating factor:
contrast situations that, in our examples, are formally irrelevant
for the solution, but foreground one of the factors in question and
thus frame the task in different ways.
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CAUSAL JUDGMENTS AND CONTRAST SITUATIONS
When thinking about whether the piece of wood or the water
is responsible for the ﬂoating, people establish a “causal ﬁeld”
(Mackie, 1986), which includes all factors they regard as relevant,
and then they pick up and foreground one (or more) factors from
this ﬁeld as “causes” for the speciﬁc event.
Different kinds of processes contribute to this foregrounding: in
some cases, one entity catches people’s attentiondue toparticularly
salient features (e.g.,Duval,1972) or because it results fromhuman
actions and thus appears controllable (White, 1995; Sloman and
Lagnado, 2005). In other cases, the temporal sequence of events is
regarded as crucial (e.g., Mill, 1961), or assumptions about what
is abnormal as compared to a normal course of events (Hart and
Honoré, 1959; Hilton and Slugoski, 1986; Kahneman and Miller,
1986), or what is relevant for an addressee as compared to his or
her state of knowledge (Hilton, 1990; Hilton and Erb, 1996). In
line with attribution theory and the notion of man as a scientist
(Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973), comparing situations in which one
factor is present versus absent or modiﬁed while other factors are
held constant provides another important strategy for selecting
what to consider as “the cause,” as suggested by covariation-based
models of causal reasoning (e.g., Cheng and Novick, 1990, 1992;
Cheng, 1997; White, 2002; Buehner, 2005; Perales and Shanks,
2007).
Some of these foregrounding processes build on an explicit
reference to a contrasting situation (cf. Hesslow,1983). Thismech-
anism can also be applied to our wood-and-water example: here,
people might easily think of entities other than wood that either
ﬂoat or sink in water. Comparing the wood to these entities fore-
grounds the wood, while the water represents the background. As
a consequence, people would favor the wood over the water as
the causative element, and in explaining the ﬂoating they would
think about which properties characterize wood in contrast to
non-ﬂoating objects rather than about the relation between the
critical elements wood and water.
Our survey on causal judgments in symmetric physical settings
(Bender and Beller, 2011) provided some support for this argu-
ment. In one scenario, participants were asked in a “no contrast”
baseline condition to decidewhether“the fact that CO2 stays down
in air is due to the CO2 or the air.” We then added a contrast sit-
uation that foregrounds either the ﬂoater (“Helium rises in air. Is
the fact that CO2 stays down in air due to . . .?”) or the medium
(“CO2 rises in water. Is the fact that CO2 stays down in air due to
. . .?”). From a physical point of view, these contrast situations are
not relevant for answering the question; what counts is the rela-
tion between the two critical entities CO2 and air. Nevertheless,
the contrasts foreground one of the factors and may thus lead peo-
ple to think about differences between two situations: why does
CO2 stay down in air, whereas helium rises? Or: why does CO2
stay down in air, whereas it rises in water? By pointing explicitly
to one of the factors as a “difference maker,” the contrast situa-
tion should directly affect people’s responses: they should prefer
the CO2 as causative in the ﬁrst case, and the medium air in the
second case.
The ﬁndings from Bender and Beller (2011) support this argu-
ment as illustrated in Figure 1. There, the results for the three
“CO2 in air” tasks are represented as concrete tasks and compared
FIGURE 1 | Preference for “CO2”/“gas” as the prime cause (from
Bender and Beller, 2011; settings (E) and (F); German sample, N = 93).
to analogous abstract versions thereof (which will be explained
later on). In the no-contrast condition, a moderate imbalance
was observed: 66.7% of the participants indicated the gas CO2 as
causative. The preference for the gas CO2 increased if the ﬂoater
was contrasted (84.0% CO2), and it decreased if the medium was
contrasted (47.8% CO2).
This ﬁnding, however, is restricted in three ways. The ﬁrst
concerns the breadth of the results. From the nine physical set-
tings included in our 2011 survey, only one was devoted to this
kind of contrast effect. The second restriction is more severe as it
concerns how we assessed people’s causal assignments. With one
exception, all of our tasks in that survey used the forced-choice
format as illustrated in the examples above. The main reason for
doing so was that we wanted to prevent participants “from simply
activating their formal knowledge acquired in school” (Bender
and Beller, 2011, p. 9) and thereby to “tap into deeper, folk-
theoretical convictions” (p. 4). While we are still convinced that
the forced-choice responses reﬂect people’s spontaneous assign-
ments of causality and are thus sufﬁcient to detect such weighting
effects, it is true that this format leaves participants with no
choice other than to give a biased judgment. By excluding the
possibility to indicate that the two entities in question contribute
equally to the effect, the forced-choice responses might not do
justice to people’s physical convictions andmight inﬂate the imbal-
ance. Finally, we so far collected assignment data only and thus
focused on which decision people take, but not on why they
take a speciﬁc decision, that is, how they explain their causal
assignments.
GOALS OF THE STUDY
In the following, we present two experiments that aim at general-
izing and validating the contrast effect from our previous survey
(Bender andBeller,2011). Thephysical settings and the assessment
methods were chosen so as to allow for a direct comparison with
previous data. The ﬁrst experiment maintains the response for-
mat (forced-choice), but uses a different physical relation: “wood
ﬂoating on water.” The result can inform us about whether or not
the effect generalizes to another physical setting. By contrast, the
second experiment maintains the original physical relation (“CO2
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staying down in air”), but combines it with a different response
format (an analog rating scale). This time, the result can inform
us about the extent to which the response format contributes to
the effect.
We hypothesize that the contrast effect generalizes to differ-
ent physical settings. If participants take the contrasting situations
into account, this should affect their causal assignments as com-
pared to a baseline task without such a contrast, and it should be
reﬂected in how they explain the physical event in question. To get
a spontaneous evaluation of which factor is considered to be the
main cause, we ﬁrst ask for a causal assignment, and then for an
explanation of the decision. The response format might have a dif-
ferentiating effect: participants’ causal assignments might overall
be less biased with the rating format than with the forced-choice
format as only the former allows them to consider the relational
character of the task appropriately. This might also be reﬂected in
people’s explanations.
Finally, in order to be able to assess the extent to which
possible content-speciﬁc associations with the involved entities
(wood/water and CO2/air, respectively) contribute to partici-
pants’ assignments and give rise to content effects beyond the
type of physical interaction (as reported, for example, by
Beller and Kuhnmünch, 2007, and Beller et al., 2009), we imple-
mented thephysical relations (e.g.,“ﬂoating”) in twoversions each:
in a concrete version (e.g., instantiated by “wood” and “water”)
and an abstract version (e.g., instantiated by “an object” and “a
liquid”).
EXPERIMENT 1
This experiment aimed at generalizing the contrast effect from
Bender and Beller (2011) to a different physical setting, while the
response format (forced-choice) was the same as in our original
survey. For the baseline condition with an explicit contrast situa-
tion, we expected a preference for the ﬂoating object as observed
in a previous study (Beller et al., 2009).
METHOD
Participants
A total of 111 students (30 male, 81 female) from the University of
Freiburg (Germany) volunteered to participate in the experiment.
The mean age was M = 22.7 years (SD = 4.61; range: 18–45
years).
Materials
Six causal assignment tasks were constructed by crossing three
conditions with different contrast situations (no contrast, con-
trasting object vs. contrasting liquid) with two content scenarios
(concrete vs. abstract). All tasks referred to the same physical rela-
tion (an object ﬂoating on a liquid) and called for a forced-choice
decision on which of the two entities involved is responsible for
the ﬂoating.
The three concrete tasks read as follows:
No contrast: The fact that a piece of wood ﬂoats on water is
basically due to ...
 the piece of wood.
 the water.
Contrasting object: A piece of coal sinks in water. The fact that
a piece of wood ﬂoats on water is basically due to ...
 the piece of wood.
 the water.
Contrasting liquid: A piece of wood sinks in oil. The fact that
the same piece of wood ﬂoats on water is basically due to ...
 the piece of wood.
 the water.
The corresponding abstract tasks read as follows:
No contrast: The fact that an object ﬂoats on a liquid is basically
due to ...
 the object.
 the liquid.
Contrasting object: An object A sinks in a liquid. The fact that a
different object B ﬂoats on the same liquid is basically due to ...
 object B.
 the liquid.
Contrasting liquid: An object sinks in a liquid A. The fact that
the same object ﬂoats on a different liquid B is basically due to ...
 the object.
 liquid B.
Participants were instructed to make their assignment spon-
taneously and to mark one option. Each task was followed on
a separate page by the request to brieﬂy explain their decision
(“Bitte begründen Sie kurz Ihre Entscheidung.”). All materials
were presented in German and were pretested for comprehensi-
bility.
Procedure and design
The experiment was part of a larger paper-and-pencil question-
naire study with different kinds of reasoning tasks (none of the
other tasks, however, was on a causal topic). The part of the ques-
tionnaire relevant here consisted of four pages: (i) ﬁrst causal
assignment task, (ii) ﬁrst explanation, (iii) second assignment task,
and (iv) second explanation.
For each questionnaire booklet, one of the three concrete con-
trast conditions was paired with one of the three abstract contrast
conditions (in ﬁrst or second position, respectively). From the 18
possible combinations of conditions, we implemented all possi-
bilities except those with a no-contrast condition in the second
position. The reason for this restriction was that we wanted to
prevent a possible carry-over of contrast information from the
more complex conditions with a contrasting situation to the sim-
pler no-contrast conditions. We thus had six pairings with a
concrete task in ﬁrst position and six pairings with an abstract
task in ﬁrst position. The order of the answer options (object
ﬁrst vs. liquid ﬁrst) was balanced within the pairings (across the
two tasks) and also across the pairings. We prepared an appro-
priate number of the different booklet versions so that, in the
end, the different conditions of both the concrete and the abstract
scenario occurred with (almost) equal frequencies across partici-
pants. Finally, participantswere assigned randomly to theprepared
questionnaires.
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FIGURE 2 | Preference for “a piece of wood”/“the object” as the prime
cause in Experiment 1.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Participants’ causal assignments are presented in Figure 2 with
values above 50% indicating a more frequent choice of the ﬂoater
as causative (i.e., the piece of wood or the object, respectively), and
values below 50% indicating a more frequent choice of the carrier
(i.e., the water or the liquid). The data pattern conﬁrms both the
predicted preference for the ﬂoater in the no-contrast baseline and
the effects of the contrasting situations.
A four-way log-linear analysis was conducted (Kennedy, 1992)
with the causal assignments (ﬂoater vs. carrier) as dependent
variable, “content,” (abstract vs. concrete) and “contrasting situa-
tion” (no contrast vs. contrasting objects vs. contrasting liquids2)
as independent variables, and “position of task” (ﬁrst vs. second
position), and “order of answer options” (object ﬁrst vs. liquid
ﬁrst) as control variables. The analysis revealed that the two con-
trol variables were not necessary to explain the data; they could be
removed from the model without losing the ﬁt (ﬁt of the result-
ing model “content × contrasting situation”: G2 = 22.1, df = 14,
p = 0.077)3. As expected, the causal assignments varied strongly
across the three contrasting conditions (main effect “contrasting
situation”: G2 = 90.4, df = 2, p < 0.001). No main effect “content”
occurred (G2 = 0.966, df = 1, p = 0.326), but an interaction “con-
tent × contrasting situation” (G2 = 8.7, df = 2, p = 0.013), which
was mainly triggered by the contrasting liquids condition, with
the contrast effect being more pronounced in the abstract version
than in the concrete version.
The concrete tasks revealed the following results: in the no-
contrast condition, participants preferred the wood as causative
for the ﬂoating (68.4% wood vs. 31.6% water; χ2 = 5.2, df = 1,
n = 38, p = 0.023). The preference for wood increased if the
object was contrasted (90.0% wood vs. 10% water; n = 40), and
it changed to the water if the liquid was contrasted (33.3% wood
vs. 66.7% water; n = 33). The causal assignments in the two con-
trasting conditions differed from one another (χ2 = 25.3, df = 1,
2As the baseline tasks were only presented in ﬁrst position, four “zero cells”
were deﬁned to accommodate the fact that not all possible combinations of the
independent variables were instantiated.
3A log-linear model ﬁts the data if the test statistic does not indicate a signiﬁcant
difference between model and data.
n = 73, p < 0.001), and also from the no-contrast condition
(χ2 = 5.6, df = 1, n = 78, p = 0.018, and χ2 = 8.7, df = 1, n = 71,
p = 0.003, respectively).
An analogous pattern was found for the abstract tasks: in the
no-contrast condition, participants again preferred the object as
causative for the ﬂoating (76.3%object vs. 23.7% liquid;χ2 = 10.5,
df = 1, n = 38, p = 0.001). The preference for the object
increased if the object was contrasted (92.1% object vs. 7.9% liq-
uid; n = 38), and it changed to the carrying liquid if the liquid
was contrasted (5.7% object vs. 94.3% liquids; n = 35). The causal
assignments in the two contrasting conditions differed from one
another (χ2 = 54.4, df = 1, n = 73, p < 0.001). Compared to the
no-contrast condition, the increase triggered by the object con-
trast was only marginally signiﬁcant (χ2 = 3.6, df = 1, n = 76,
p = 0.059), whereas the decrease triggered by the liquid contrast
was signiﬁcant (χ2 = 37.2, df = 1, n = 73, p < 0.001).
These ﬁndings replicate the biased causal assignments for the
relation “wood ﬂoats on water” in the absence of explicit contrasts
(as described by Beller et al., 2009, and Bender and Beller, 2011),
it demonstrates the contrast effect for this setting, and it suggests
that the two effects are only weakly affected by the speciﬁc types
of entities involved.
In order to shed light on participants’ rationale for their deci-
sions, we had asked them for explanations. Their statements were
classiﬁed into four categories: “relational,” “property,” “contrast,”
and “others.” A statement was classiﬁed as relational if it men-
tioned the two relevant factors as being equally causative (e.g.,
“Actually, both are responsible”) or if it explicitly referred to
an interaction between these two factors (e.g., “The density of
wood is lower than the density of water”). Some explanations
focused on an individual property either of the ﬂoating object
(e.g., “The wood contains air” or “density of the wood”) or of
the carrier liquid (e.g., “due to the buoyancy of the water”).
Finally, a statement was classiﬁed as referring to a contrast if
it compared the ﬂoating object to another, non-ﬂoating object
(e.g., “Coal is heavier than wood”), if it compared the carrier
liquid to another, non-carrying liquid (e.g., “Oil is lighter than
water”), or if it referred to a comparison of situations in abstract
terms (e.g., “The condition that was changed, the liquids, is the
deciding factor”). The frequencies of the different types of expla-
nations were aggregated for the two contrast conditions and across
concrete and abstract tasks, as the differences between the two
content versions were only small. The results are presented in
Figure 3.
The explanation data revealed two main ﬁndings. First, in the
no-contrast tasks, participants gave all three types of explana-
tions with similar frequencies. Explanations in terms of individual
properties of ﬂoater and liquid slightly prevailed, mostly referring
to density and weight. This also means that some participants
used the contrast strategy to explain the ﬂoating without being
triggered by an explicit contrast situation. Second, compared
to this baseline, relational explanations decreased from 32.9 to
19.2% when a contrasting situation was introduced (χ2 = 5.2,
df = 1, N = 222, p = 0.023), and so did property explana-
tions; they decreased from 46.1 to 18.5% (χ2 = 18.7, df = 1,
N = 222, p < 0.001). On the other hand, contrast explanations
increased from 35.5 to 64.4% (χ2 = 16.8, df = 1, N = 222,
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FIGURE 3 | Explanations of the causal assignments in Experiment 1 (in
%; N represents the sum of concrete and abstract tasks).
p < 0.001). As a manipulation check, this ﬁnding validates our
experimental setting, and it supports our argument that a contrast
situation leads participants to focus on the entities involved in this
contrast.
All in all, Experiment 1 was successful in extending the contrast
effect on a new symmetric physical setting. However, as in our pre-
vious studies, we used a response format that forced participants
to take a dichotomous decision. With this format, we intended to
outmaneuvre possible effects of school education and to tap into
deeper, folk-theoretical convictions, but it could be argued that
this format also has skewed participants’ responses in an unin-
tended way and beyond their actual preferences. This concern is
addressed in the next experiment.
EXPERIMENT 2
In order to assess the inﬂuence of the response format, Experiment
2 combines the original physical setting from Bender and Beller
(2011)—CO2 staying down in air—with an analog rating scale
that allows participants to allocate the relative causal effectiveness
of the two entities in question. While the possibility to indicate
the physically adequate relational answer might generally reduce
the imbalance in participants’ causal assignments, we nevertheless
expected to ﬁnd an effect of contrast situations.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 128 students (32 male, 96 female) from the University
of Freiburg (Germany) volunteered to participate in the experi-
ment (there was no overlap with participants from Experiment
1). The mean age was M = 22.5 years (SD = 4.71; range: 18–45
years).
Materials
Six causal assignment taskswere constructedby crossing three con-
ditions with different contrast situations (no contrast, contrasting
ﬂoater vs. contrastingmedium)with two content conditions (con-
crete vs. abstract). All tasks referred to the same physical relation
(a gas staying down in a substance) and allowed participants to
indicate the relative causal effectiveness of the entities involved by
means of an analog rating scale of 10 cm length.
The three concrete tasks read as follows:
No contrast: The fact that CO2 stays down in air is basically
due to . . .
the CO2 |———————————————| the air.
Contrasting ﬂoater: Helium rises in air. The fact that CO2
stays down in air is basically due to . . .
the CO2 |———————————————| the air.
Contrasting medium: CO2 rises in water. The fact that CO2
stays down in air is basically due to . . .
the CO2 |———————————————| the air.
The corresponding abstract tasks read as follows:
No contrast: The fact that gas G stays down in substance S is
basically due to . . .
gas G |———————————————| substance S.
Contrasting ﬂoater: Gas X rises in substance S. The fact that
gas G stays down in substance S is basically due to . . .
gas G |———————————————| substance S.
Contrasting medium: Gas G rises in substance X. The fact that
gas G stays down in substance S is basically due to . . .
gas G |———————————————| substance S.
Participants were instructed to make their assignment sponta-
neously. Each task was followed on a separate page by the request
to brieﬂy explain their decision from the previous task (“Bitte
begründen Sie kurz Ihre Entscheidung aus der vorigenAufgabe.”).
All materials were presented in German and were pretested for
comprehensibility.
Procedure and design
These were analogous to Experiment 1. However, instead of the
order of the response options, the polarity of the rating scale was
balanced (CO2/gas G marking the left side vs. the right side of the
scale).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Participants’ causal assignments were coded by measuring their
marks on the rating scale (accurate to 0.5 mm) ranging from 0 (the
mark was right on the endpoint labeled with“air/substance”) to 10
(the mark was right on the endpoint labeled with “CO2/gas G”).
Therefore, values above 5.0 indicate a stronger causal role of the
ﬂoater (CO2/gasG), and values below5.0 indicate a stronger causal
role of the medium (air/substance S). The results are presented
in Figure 4. The data patterns of the concrete and the abstract
tasks generally replicate the ﬁndings from Experiment 1 (Figure 2)
and from our previous survey (Figure 1), albeit in a less extreme
manner.
In the ﬁrst step, we checked the rating data for possible position
effects. To this end, two analyzes of variance were conducted (one
for the concrete tasks and one for the abstract tasks) with “posi-
tion of task” (ﬁrst vs. second position) and “contrasting situation”
(contrasting ﬂoater vs. medium) as independent variables. We did
not include the no-contrast conditions in these analyzes as the
respective tasks were presented always in ﬁrst position. As the two
analyzes did not indicate any position effects (for all effects with
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FIGURE 4 | Preference for “CO2”/“the gas” as the prime cause in
Experiment 2.
“position”: Fs(1,80) < 3.33, ps > 0.072), it seemed safe to run the
subsequent analyzes without this factor.
In the second step, we analyzed the ratings with “contrasting
situation” (now all three types) and“polarity of the rating scale” as
independent variables, again separately for concrete and abstract
tasks. The two analyzes did not indicate any polarity effects [for
all effects with “polarity”: Fs(1,122) < 1.75, Fs(2, 122) < 0.35,
ps > 0.189], but revealed main effects of the contrasting situation
[concrete content: F(2,122) = 3.72, p = 0.027; abstract content:
F(2,122) = 13.44, p < 0.001].
The concrete tasks exhibited the following results: in the no-
contrast condition, we found an imbalanced causal assignment:
participants preferred the gas (CO2) over the medium (air),
with M = 5.94 (n = 44) being signiﬁcantly different from the
balanced value 5.0; t(43) = 2.33, p = 0.025. The causal assign-
ment changed as expected, when a contrasting situation was
added. Participants regarded CO2 as more causative if the gas
was contrasted (M = 6.45, n = 42), but as less causative if the
medium was contrasted (M = 4.92, n = 42). The average rat-
ings in the two contrasting conditions differed from one another
(LSD = 1.53, p = 0.008), but not from the no-contrast baseline
condition (LSD = 0.51, p = 0.372, and LSD = 1.02, p = 0.073,
respectively).
A slightly different pattern was found for the abstract tasks:
this time, the no-contrast condition indicated a quite symmetric
causal assignment with M = 4.83 (n = 44), not being signiﬁcantly
different from the balanced value 5.0; t(43) = −0.523, p = 0.604.
But, again, the assignments changed as expected, when a contrast-
ing situation was added: participants regarded the gas as more
causative than the medium if the gas was contrasted (M = 6.07,
n = 42), but as less causative if the medium was contrasted
(M = 3.38, n = 42). The average ratings in the two contrasting
conditions differed fromone another (LSD= 2.69, p< 0.001), and
also from the no-contrast condition (LSD = 1.24, p = 0.017, and
LSD = 1.45, p = 0.006, respectively). Compared to the concrete
tasks, responses in the abstract tasks showed generally lower values,
indicating a stronger weight on the medium as causative [abstract:
M = 4.76; concrete: M = 5.77; t(127) = −2.876, p = 0.005, paired
samples test], and the inﬂuence of contrasting situations seemed
to be stronger.
Next, we categorized people’s explanations of their causal
assignments as described for Experiment 1. The results are shown
inFigure 5, aggregated across concrete and abstract tasks as the dif-
ferences between the two content versions were again only small.
The proportion of relational explanations was clearly higher than
inExperiment 1 anddid not differ between the no-contrast and the
contrasting conditions (53.4 and 53.0%, respectively; χ2 = 0.004,
df = 1,N = 256, p= 0.947). But, similar to Experiment 1, property
explanations decreased from 27.3 to 16.1% (χ2 = 4.5, df = 1,
N = 256, p = 0.033) and contrast explanations increased from
5.7 to 22.0% (χ2 = 11.2, df = 1, N = 256, p = 0.001) when a
contrasting situation was available.
The increase of relational explanations, and correspondingly
the decrease of the other types of explanations, is most proba-
bly a direct consequence of the differences in the response format
(as is the overall less extreme causal assignments compared to
Experiment 1): with the forced-choice format, participants have
to commit themselves to one entity as causative in the assign-
ment task, and later on have to explain this decision regardless of
whether or not they are able to ﬁgure out the physically appropriate
response. With the rating-format, however, participants can indi-
cate in the assignment task that both entities are equally causative,
and are therefore not restricted later on to explain an either-or
decision, but might draw on their physical knowledge instead.
If we assume that those participants providing an adequate
relational explanation did not base their (preceding) causal assign-
ment on a contrasting situation, while the other participants did
include a contrast in their reasoning in one or the other way, then
we would expect the contrast effect to disappear for the ﬁrst group
and to be more pronounced for the second. To test this prediction,
we re-analyzed the ratings by means of two analyzes of variance
(one for the concrete tasks and one for the abstract tasks) in which
we included the “type of explanation” (relational vs. all other) as
an independent variable in addition to the “contrasting situation”
and the “polarity of the rating scale.” As before, these analyzes
revealed no polarity effects, but main effects of the contrasting
situation [concrete content: F(2,116) = 4.51, p = 0.013; abstract
content: F(2,116) = 13.91, p < 0.001]. With regard to the type of
explanation, we got different results depending on the task content
as indicated in Figure 6.
FIGURE 5 | Explanations of the causal assignments in Experiment 2 (in
%; N represents the sum of concrete and abstract tasks).
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FIGURE 6 | Preferences in Experiment 2 (A) for “CO2” as the prime
cause in the concrete scenarios and (B) for “the gas” in the abstract
scenarios, depending on the type of explanation.
For the concrete tasks, we did not ﬁnd any effect of the
type of explanation [largest F(1,116) = 3.11, p = 0.080]. The
contrast effect appears to be weaker for participants with rela-
tional explanations than for those with non-relational explana-
tions, but the interaction was not signiﬁcant [F(2,116) = 1.47,
p = 0.235]. If we take a more qualitative perspective and count
how many participants placed their rating in the middle of the
scale, deﬁned as the interval [4.5; 5.5], we ﬁnd nonetheless
a striking difference: among those 75 participants with rela-
tional explanations, 64% placed their rating in the middle of the
scale, but only 9% among the 53 participants with non-relational
explanations.
For the abstract tasks, the interaction “type of explana-
tion × contrasting situation” was signiﬁcant [F(2,116) = 13.48,
p < 0.001]. Here, the causal assignments of the participants with
relational explanations were nearly perfectly balanced in each of
the three contrast conditions, indicating that the overall contrast
effect reported in Figure 4 was mainly driven by the participants
with non-relational explanations. This is also reﬂected by the qual-
itative inspection: among those 61 participants with relational
explanations, 77% placed their rating in the middle of the scale,
but only 22%among the 67participantswithnon-relational expla-
nations. These ﬁndings are in line with our hypothesis that the
unbiased causal assignments result from not referring to a contrast
situation, as suggested by participants (post hoc) explanations.
On the whole, Experiment 2 was successful in validating the
contrast effect with a less restrictive response format, and the
inspection of people’s explanations provided further evidence
for the assumed contrasting mechanisms. Participants’ causal
assignments appeared to be fairly well reﬂected in their later expla-
nations, but the correspondence was not perfect. In about 30% of
the cases, in which participants apparently knew that both enti-
ties are equally involved in bringing about the effect, they still had
given one of the entities a stronger weight.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Physical settings in which two entities interact to bring about an
effect are symmetric, and, from that point of view, responsibil-
ity should be assigned in a balanced manner. Often, however,
people make imbalanced causal assignments by giving one of the
factors a strongerweight. Against this background, the goals of this
paper were twofold: we wanted to validate the method of assess-
ing such weighting effects, and to put the contrast effect from
Bender and Beller (2011) on a broader empirical basis. Starting
from the one relevant example from our 2011 survey, Experi-
ment 1 combined a different physical relation with the original
response format (forced-choice) thereby broadening the kinds of
physical settings considered, whereas Experiment 2 combined the
original physical relation with a new response format (an analog
rating scale) thereby providing us with insights into the role of the
response format.
Taken together, the experiments yielded four main results:
ﬁrst, in three of the four conditions without an overt contrast
we observed biased causal assignments. These were more pro-
nounced in Experiment 1 with the forced-choice format than in
Experiment 2 with the rating format, and they replicate previous
ﬁndings quite well (Beller et al., 2009; Bender and Beller, 2011).
The decision on which entity to regard as causative is not with-
out consequences, as we then tend to overestimate the strength
and importance of the cause for bringing about the effect (White,
2006, 2007). White (2006) considers such cause-effect asymme-
tries as a general feature of human causal reasoning that affects
most of what people perceive and believe regarding the causal
underpinning of the world.
Second, the response format clearly made a difference. Giving
participants the possibility to indicate the relative causal effective-
ness of the two entities in question, instead of forcing them into a
decision, resulted generally in more balanced causal assignments
and more relational explanations. This does not imply, however,
that all biases automatically disappearwith this kindof assessment.
The concrete no-contrast task in Experiment 2 is a case in point,
showing a small but nevertheless stable imbalance (see Figure 4).
The less extreme responses with the rating scale may have two rea-
sons. On the one hand, the rating format allows people to directly
express that the two entities are equally important, and many of
the participants in Experiment 2 did so. In fact, 45% of all ratings
fell into the interval [4.5; 5.5] that represents the middle of the
scale. On the other hand, even those participants who gave one
entity a stronger weight often hesitated to discount the other entity
completely; only 10.5% of all participants marked an endpoint of
the scale.
Third, irrespective of the response format, the two experiments
conﬁrm that people are sensitive to contrast information. Experi-
ment 2 replicates the general data pattern from Bender and Beller
(2011), while Experiment 1 establishes the contrast effect for a
different physical setting and thus broadens the empirical basis
of this phenomenon. In both cases, contrast effects were found
both for the concrete and the abstract task versions. The contrast
situation draws people’s attention to the contrasting factor and
lets them weight this factor more strongly. Even in our baseline
conditions without an explicit contrast, some of the participants
explained their causal assignment by providing a contrast. Our
ﬁndings thus underline the importance of contrast situations in
causal reasoning and judgment.
Finally, the results also provide some indication for content
effects (Beller and Spada, 2003; Beller et al., 2009; Bender and
Beller, 2011). On the one hand, participants’ causal assignments
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varied with the speciﬁc entities involved in a physical relation, at
least to some extent. For instance, when reasoning about why a gas
is staying down in a substance, participants generally gave the gas a
stronger weight in the concrete condition than in the abstract con-
dition, irrespective of the response format (see Figures 1 and 4).
This difference suggests that speciﬁc associations with the one or
the other entity involved in the interaction—for example, thatCO2
is a particularly dense gas—can pave the way for a causal weighting
in a speciﬁc direction. On the other hand, the type of interaction
plays an additional role, as an inspection of Figures 1 and 2 sug-
gests. Here, with the response format held constant, the strength
of the weighting effects clearly varies with the type of physical
relation.
Two possible limitations need to be addressed though: ﬁrst,
we had instructed our participants to make their causal assign-
ments spontaneously. This should have led them into a more
intuitive, “system 1” based mode of reasoning, instead of a
more deliberate, “system 2” based mode (Evans, 2003, 2009),
and this was intended for the very same reason that we used
the forced-choice response format: we actually wanted to tap
into people’s folk-theoretical convictions instead of simply acti-
vating some physical knowledge acquired in school. While such
a suppression of deliberate thinking might contribute to inﬂate
the number of imbalanced causal assignments, it does not invali-
date the consequences of basing causal judgments on contrasting
situations as attested by the analysis of the explanations. More-
over, we have no clear indication to which extent participants’
judgments were in fact spontaneous, as they were granted as
much time as they needed to ﬁll in the questionnaire. The effect
of this instruction should thus not be overrated. To properly
assess this, however, the present experiments could be extended
in future research so as to compare our spontaneity instruc-
tion that triggers system-1-based thinking with an instruction
that demands thinking through the problem carefully and thus
triggers system-2-based thinking. Second, as might have been
noticed, the concrete and the abstract version of the gas set-
ting in Experiment 2 were not exactly parallel. The concrete
version states that “CO2 stays down in air” (with air being a
mixture of gases), whereas the abstract version states that “gas
G stays down in substance S” and thus introduces a different
kind of medium (the substance) that might or might not be
aeriform. The reason for using the term “substance” was that
we wanted to make clear that one contrast really involves two
kinds of medium (substance X and S). Being uncertain about
what is meant by “a substance” might reduce biased causal
assignments, particularly in the no-contrast baseline condition.
Once an explicit contrast situation is introduced, a rational for
the decision is introduced so that the uncertainty no longer
matters.
Finally, two broader questions remain to be answered, a norma-
tive one and a psychological one: should we consider the contrast
effect in symmetric physical settings a bias? And,what is the reason
for the imbalanced causal assignments in the conditions without
an explicit contrast?
The ﬁrst question concerns the tension between what (many)
people actually do in the contrasting conditions and what they
should do from a physical point of view. The normative answer
is clear: as the physical relations in question are symmetrical,
the two entities involved should be weighted equally strongly—
irrespective of the included contrast situation. To answer the
question why a piece of wood is ﬂoating on water, it is simply
not relevant whether a piece of coal does or does not ﬂoat on
water. Framed in this way, it may appear as a bias if people take
the contrast into account while not recognizing the symmetry
of the physical relation. And, as documented in people’s expla-
nations, the contrast situations distract at least some of them
from thinking about the properties of the two relevant enti-
ties. But there is good reason for considering such contrasts.
Not only does the contrast strategy comply with Grice’s prin-
ciple of relevance in conversation (Grice, 1975, 1989) in that
all information given in a task should be considered important
for its solution. This may have generated a kind of demand
characteristics to include the contrast in the reasoning pro-
cess. Comparing situations is also a typical strategy in causal
reasoning, which can provide important hints for the search
of a causal explanation of the phenomenon in question. In
other words: thinking about the difference between a piece of
wood and a piece of coal in their relation to water is indeed
an important step toward understanding the phenomenon of
ﬂoating.
The second question on how the imbalanced causal assign-
ments in the no-contrast conditions can be explained is more
difﬁcult to answer. Here, participants’ explanations—albeit as post
hoc rationalizations not fully conclusive—might again provide us
with some insights. A substantial number of participants gave
a correct relational explanation such as “The density of CO2 is
higher than the density of air,” but failed to recognize the sym-
metry of this relation and ascribed the relevant property only to
one entity (mostly to CO2 in this speciﬁc example). Other par-
ticipants seemed to focus from the outset on speciﬁc properties
that came to their mind for one of the entities (as one type of
content effect), for example, “wood contains air,”“the surface ten-
sion of water,” or “buoyancy exerted by water.” We also found
arguments that build on contrasting situations, for example, com-
paring abnormal to normal states (e.g., “normally, gases rise in a
substance”) or on comparisons of observed to hypothetical states
(“If the gas was lighter, then it would rise”). These are indicative
for the relevance of norms (e.g., Hart and Honoré, 1959; Hilton
and Slugoski, 1986; Kahneman and Miller, 1986) and for counter-
factual reasoning processes (e.g., Byrne, 2002; Mandel et al., 2005).
In general, we can assume the choice of contrast situations to be
guided by how easily people might think of alternatives (Byrne,
2005). And ﬁnally, a small proportion of the participants argued
purely linguistically: “The gas is the subject of the sentence.” Cor-
responding linguistic effects are reported, for example, by Beller
et al. (2009).
Taken together, this diversity of explanations suggests that
biases in causal assignments are (likely) triggered not by one sin-
gle rationale, but can be triggered by a host of different cues.
The general mechanism involves processes of activating, select-
ing, and weighting reasons, but we have only just begun to
explore this conglomeration—by singling out and varying the
inﬂuence of some factors or, in other words, by contrasting
situations.
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